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Abstract  
Estimates show that there is a significant need for more investments into sustainable projects 
to meet the climate goals set in the Paris Climate Agreement. Green bonds are a relatively new 
type of financial security developed to channelize capital into more environmental-friendly 
projects. “Green” financial securities, like green bonds, creates an opportunity for investors to 
contribute to the green shift. However, it is unclear whether investors sacrifice some of their 
returns when investing in environmental-friendly securities instead of conventional securities. 
The objective of our study is to investigate whether investors receive lower yields on their 
green bond investments, compared to what they would have earned on identical conventional 
bonds. More precise, our study examines if investors receive lower yields from labeled green 
bonds compared to what they earn on similar conventional bonds in the Nordic secondary 
markets. As previous research on this topic is limited, our study will contribute with new 
insight into the Nordic bond markets, which will be valuable for both investors and issuers.   
A matching method is used to examine whether investors receive lower yields on Nordic green 
bonds compared to conventional bonds. In this method, each green bond is matched with a 
similar conventional synthetic bond, which is composed of two conventional bonds. Further, 
a fixed effects regression is conducted to investigate whether there is a difference in the 
secondary market yield between the green bond and the matched synthetic bond, both for the 
whole sample and for various subsamples. A total of 77 Nordic green bonds are matched and 
analyzed in this research. Additionally, the estimated greeniums is regressed on different bond 
characteristics to capture potential determinants of the green bond premium.    
The findings show no statistically significant difference in the yield between green and 
conventional bonds when the full sample is analyzed. Hence, there cannot be stated that there 
is a greenium for the full sample. However, when the full sample is divided into subsamples, 
three of the subsamples have statistically significant greeniums. These subsamples are bonds 
issued in SEK, Investment grade bonds, and bonds with an issue amount between 251-500 
million SEK. The greeniums found for the respective subsamples are 0.64 bp, 0.60 bp, and 1.2 
bp.  
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Sammendrag     
Det er estimert at det trengs en enorm mengde investeringer i bærekraftige prosjekter for at 
verden skal nå de målene satt i Parisavtalen. Grønne obligasjoner er en relativt ny type 
finansielt aktiva, hvor hovedhensikten er å kanalisere mer kapital inn i miljøgunstige 
investeringer. Disse grønne obligasjonene gir investorene muligheten til å bidra til det grønne 
skiftet. Det er samtidig uklart hvorvidt dette bidraget kommer med en ekstra kostnad for 
investorene, i form av lavere avkastning. Hensikten med denne oppgaven er å analysere om 
investorer oppnår lavere avkastning ved å investere i grønne obligasjoner, kontra hva de ville 
oppnådd ved å investere i konvensjonelle obligasjoner. Mer presist vil denne studien 
undersøke om investorer oppnår lavere annenhåndsmarkeds avkastning i nordiske grønne 
obligasjoner enn hva de ville gjort ved å investere i ellers like nordiske konvensjonelle 
obligasjoner. Tidligere forskning på dette temaet er begrenset, og vår analyse vil derfor tilføre 
ny informasjon som er verdifull for både investorer og utstedere av grønne obligasjoner i 
Norden.    
For å undersøke om investorer oppnår en lavere avkastning på nordiske grønne obligasjoner 
sammenlignet med konvensjonelle obligasjoner benyttes en sammenligningsmetode. I denne 
metoden blir hver grønne obligasjon satt sammen med en syntetisk konvensjonell obligasjon. 
Den syntetiske obligasjonen er her sammensatt av to konvensjonelle obligasjoner. Deretter 
undersøkes det om det eksisterer en forskjell i avkastning ved å sammenligne 
annenhåndsmarkedets avkastning mellom obligasjonene i hvert obligasjonspar. I tillegg til å 
kjøre analysen på hele datasettet, blir også mindre segmenter av datasettet analysert 
individuelt. Totalt blir 77 grønne obligasjoner satt sammen med konvensjonelle obligasjoner 
og videre analysert. I tillegg utføres også en regresjonsanalyse hvor den grønne premien 
fungerer som avhengig variabel for å finne potensielle forklaringsvariabler.  
Vi finner ingen signifikant forskjell i avkastning mellom grønne og konvensjonelle 
obligasjoner når hele datasettet blir analysert. Vi finner derfor ingen grønn premie i det 
nordiske markedet i sin helhet.  Når datasettet deles inn i mindre datasett, finner vi signifikante 
forskjeller i avkastning mellom grønne og konvensjonelle obligasjoner. For obligasjoner 
utstedt i SEK, for obligasjoner betegnet som investeringsgrad og for obligasjoner med et 
utstedelsesvolum mellom 251-500 millioner SEK finner vi negative grønne 
avkastningspremier på henholdsvis 0,64 bp, 0,60 bp og 1,2 bp.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation  
“Climate change increasingly poses one of the biggest long-term threats to investments.’’ 
Christiana Figueres secretary of the UNFCCC 
Climate change through global warming is one of the most prominent threats to humanity in 
the 21st century (United Nations, 2019). As a result, many global organizations as The United 
Nations (UN), IPPC, Green Climate Fund, and Bellona have highlighted the threat over the 
past decades. Consequently, public attention and acceptance have gradually increased all over 
the world.   
Recognition of the urgency in the situation has also materialized in the financial world. In 
2006 the Principles of Responsible Investments (PRI) were established. Up until now, 2300 
investors have signed to invest in line with the principles (Principles of Responsible 
Investment, 2019). Further, the Paris Agreement stresses the contribution from investors and 
the finance industry in article 2.1.C (2015), which states that the signatories commit to making 
finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-
resilient development.  
It seems like investors have accepted that they need to contribute as an increasing focus on 
environmental, social, governmental (ESG) and corporate, social, responsibility (CSR) factors 
have developed. In 2018 this development resulted in an allocation of at least USD 30,7 trillion 
into sustainable or green investments globally, which is a rise of 24 percent from 2016 (Global 
Sustainable Investment Alliance, 2018). 
However, going forward, investments into sustainable and green finance are still sorely 
needed. The Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) estimates an 
investment need of USD 95 trillion into energy, transport, water, and telecommunications 
infrastructure from 2016 to 2030. This need equals an annual amount of USD 6.3 trillion to 
reach the goals signed in the Paris Agreement (OECD, 2017). The European Union (EU) 
estimates that to reach their agreed 2030 emission goals, they must fill an investment gap of 
EUR 280 billion per year (European Commission, 2016). These estimates show that there is 
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still a substantial need for green financing and contributions going forward. And that these 
investments must come from both public- and private investors.  
There are three main green investment categories where it is possible to invest in green 
finance.  These are green lending, stocks with high ESG scores, and green bonds. Despite this, 
there is still lacking a clear definition of what “green finance” actually is. This lack of 
definition makes it both a challenging and time-consuming asset class for investors due to the 
significant due-diligence needs (Chatterjee, Fabian & Feller, 2016). However, some types of 
green investments are more defined than others. One such category is green bonds. 
A green bond is a fixed income debt instrument where the issuer uses the proceeds to finance 
“green” projects, which are projects with clear environmental benefits. The green bond market 
emerged in 2007-08 (European Commission, 2016). However, a corporate green bond market 
did not appear up until 2013 (Climate Bond Initiative, 2019d). Supporting the green bond 
development and the following exponential issue growth was the launch of the Green Bond 
Principles (GBP) and their framework in 2014 (World Bank, 2019). However, the green bond 
market is still self-regulated, but external reviews of the green bonds and their associated 
projects are possible to show that the bond is not just a greenwashing1 item. 
1.2 Existing literature 
The growing allocation into green finance has made it a hot topic for both academic and 
professional researchers studying whether there is a link between ESG and CSR performance 
and the return of an investment. Increasing amounts of research points in the direction of a 
connection between corporations’ ESG and CSR activities and the pricing of their securities, 
e.g., Dhaliwal et al., 2011, Christensen, 2016, Christensen et al., 2017.  
In recent years, after the boom in the green bond market, research on it has accelerated but is 
still at an early stage. Harrison (2019) studied the oversubscription of green bonds in the 
primary market from July to December in Europe. He finds a higher oversubscription for green 
bonds than their vanilla equivalents on average, resulting in a slightly lower spread. However, 
 
1 Greenwashing is the process of conveying a false impression or providing misleading information about how a company’s 
products are more environmentally sound. 
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the reliability of the results is discussable due to the short research period and the low number 
of observations in the research.  
Ehlers and Packer (2017), Zerbib, (2019), Larcker & Watts (2019) has conducted research 
trying to determine if green labeling a bond affects its price and yield. In other words, if 
investors’ decisions merely are based on expected risk and return or if a non-monetary 
characteristic as a green label affects the pricing of an asset, everything else held equal. In 
these studies, the findings have been contrary. Zerbib (2019) finds a statistically significant 
yield difference between green bonds and their conventional equivalents where green bonds, 
on average, have 1,4 bp lower yield, while Larckey and Watts (2019) find no evidence of a 
yield difference.  
1.3 Research question  
The described studies and results have triggered our curiosity. Until now, there is conducted 
little research on the Nordic markets2. Our research will, therefore, look further into these 
markets by investigating the following research question: 
Does a green label affect the yield and price of a bond and thereby create a greenium3 in the 
Nordic secondary bond market, and which characteristics determine the potential greenium? 
In standard theory, investors are rationale and optimize their expected risk-adjusted return 
according to the expected risk and return. Based on that, there should not be a yield difference 
between green- and conventional bonds when the green label is the single aspect separating 
them. Hence, the belief of symmetric pricing forms our primary hypothesis, H0, namely that 
there is no greenium in the Nordic Green bond markets. An alternative hypothesis, H1, is that 
there is a greenium, and green bonds are trading at lower yields than conventional bonds. 
While a third hypothesis is that green bonds trade at higher yields than conventional bonds.  
An explanation for greeniums is that there is too much capital allocated to asset managers with 
an investment mandate to buy green assets as green bonds. However, if investors are rationale 
 
2 The Nordic market is here defined as the bond markets of Danmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.  
3 Greenium is defined as the negative yield difference between a green- and conventional bond, in other words the yield of 
the green bond minus the yield of the conventional bond. 
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and not willing to accept lower yields on green bonds, this should not be possible because 
investors should then reallocate their investments. A plausible explanation can be that 
investors do not only account for expected risk and return, but also the sustainability of their 
investments. Thereby the sustainability factor can outweigh a loss of monetary profit to some 
degree. Finding plausible rationale explanations for why green bonds should return a higher 
yield than equal conventional bonds in our study is hard to imagine.     
1.4 Contribution to literature 
Research on green bonds in the Nordic markets is limited, as green bonds are a relatively new 
research topic. Consequently, there are not many papers covering the subject. However, Drage 
and Sundt (2018) have written a master thesis about green premiums in the Norwegian and 
Swedish bond markets, where they perform both a quantitative and qualitative approach to 
look at investors’ preferences.  
Our study will contribute new information on this research topic by dividing the Nordic green 
bond markets into different subsamples and analyze if the greenium varies between them and 
not just identifying if there is a greenium for the market as a whole. Further, it will analyze 
whether some characteristics affect that potential greenium, e.g., issuance amount or coupon 
level, etcetera. Lastly, our thesis is going to contribute to the existing literature by describing 
the Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish bond markets. This study will, 
therefore, contribute with valuable insight for both (potential) issuers of green bonds, and 
investors considering investing in green bonds in the Nordic markets. 
1.5 Methodology 
Our methodology is a matching approach inspired by Zerbib (2019). The central concept is to 
match one green bond with two similar conventional bonds from the same issuer, making 
triplets consisting of three bonds. The bonds should be similar on all characteristics except for 
the green label. Various imposed constraints ensure a high similarity between the bonds in 
each triplet. Bloomberg Terminal and Stamdata are used to retrieve the bond characteristics 
and their corresponding bid- and ask yields. Combining the yields from the two conventional 
bonds in each triplet then forms a synthetic conventional bond with the same maturity as the 
green bond match. Doing this makes it possible to isolate the effect of the green label as the 
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green- and synthetic bond matches shall be similar in all characteristics except for the green 
label of the bond.  
After creating all possible matches complying with our constraints, a fixed effects regression 
is run to isolate the effect of the green label in all our 77 pairs, resulting in a sample of 77 fixed 
effects. Afterward, a Wilcoxon test is conducted on the sample and on different subsamples to 
see if there is a difference in yield between the green- and conventional bonds in the full 
sample or some of the subsamples. Lastly, an OLS regression is conducted to see whether 
different bond characteristics can explain the greeniums.  
1.6 Findings 
For the full sample of matched bonds, findings show that green bonds have a yield that is, on 
average, 0.4 bp lower than the conventional bonds. However, this greenium is not statistically 
significant from zero. Dividing the sample into subsamples to see whether there are greeniums 
in some of the subsamples provides other results. In some of the subsamples, findings show 
statistically significant greeniums. They are quite small; hence the economic significance can 
be discussed; but they are observable.  
For bonds issued in Swedish Krona, a greenium of 0.64 bp is found. While for investment 
grade bonds and bonds with an issue amount between 251-500 million SEK, green bonds have 
respectively 0.6 bp and 1.2 bp lower yield. Lastly, when regressing the yield differences as the 
dependent variable, it was only the current coupon size that had a significant effect explaining 
the difference in greeniums.     
1.7 Disposition of the thesis 
The rest of this thesis consists of eight sections and is organized in the following manner. The 
upcoming section describes the background and development of the global and Nordic green 
bond market. Selection three describes and discusses relevant literature on green bond 
premiums and pricing. In the fourth selection, the methodology used building the dataset, as 
well as, the dataset is going to be explained. Further, selection five describes the empirical 
methodology. The result of our empirical model is then presented in section six. After that, in 
section seven, a discussion of our results and the limitations of the thesis is conducted. Lastly, 
the conclusion summarizes our findings and conclude in selection eight. 
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2. Background  
2.1 Green bond definition 
The International Capital Market Association’s (ICMA) definition of a green bond is (ICMA, 
2018, p. 2): 
“Green bonds are any type of bond instrument where the proceeds will be exclusively applied 
to finance or re-finance, in part or in full, new and/or existing eligible Green Projects and 
which are aligned with the four core components of the Green Bond Principles.” 
2.2 Green Bond Principles and Certification 
In 2014 the ICMA, along with thirteen major investment banks, among others Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and SEB, formed the Green Bond 
Principles (GBP) (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2014). The principles are voluntary process 
guidelines for the issuers of green bonds. These guidelines aim to encourage transparency and 
disclosure of the use of proceeds from green bond issuances and thereby promote integrity and 
trust to green bonds and the green bond market’s development. Because the green bond market 
is self-regulated, these principles minimize the risk of issuers issuing green bonds with the 
intent of greenwashing their reputation using proceeds on non-green projects.  
The GBP is composed of four core components, which are (1) the use of proceeds, (2) the 
process for project evaluation and selection, (3) management of proceeds, and (4) reporting 
(ICMA, 2018). The first principle, use of proceeds, is the cornerstone of the GBP. It states that 
the proceeds of a green bond should be used in green projects with clear environmental 
benefits and that the legal document shall describe information about the project and 
consequences related to the project.   
The second principle, the process for project evaluation and selection, states that the issuer 
should clearly show and communicate the environmental sustainability objectives. They 
should also present the process of which the bond is determined to fit the category of a green 
bond, and the related eligibility criteria (ICMA, 2018).  
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Management of the proceeds is the third principle. This principle describes how the proceeds 
should be managed. It encourages a high level of transparency in the management of the 
proceeds. It states, among other things, that the net proceeds of the bond should be credited to 
a sub-account and traced by the issuer to ensure that all proceeds used are associated with the 
intended green project (ICMA, 2018). 
The last principle is reporting. It gives information about how the issuer should inform the 
public, with up to date information, about the use of proceeds until the full amount is 
employed. Additionally, the expected impact of the use of the proceeds should be reported 
(ICMA, 2018). For a closer look at the GBP, please read the report from ICMA4 Green Bond 
Principles Voluntary Process Guidelines for Issuing Green Bonds from 2018.   
In addition to the mentioned principles, ICMA (2018) strongly recommends an external review 
of the project evaluation and selection process linked to the green bond to verify if it is in line 
with the GBPs. The goal of external reviews and certifications of the green bonds is to provide 
credibility to the green bond being an environmentally friendly project. The price of a third 
party review increases issuance costs for green bond providers. However, these costs are 
modest and vary from approximately USD 12 000 - 40 000 (Andersson et al., 2017).  S&P, 
Moody’s, DNV GL, CICERO, and EY are examples of the agents providing these reviews. 
It is possible to go beyond just external reviews and certify the green bond. Certifications 
follow the requirements of the Climate Bond Standard and Certification Scheme (CBSCS). 
The CBSCS is fully integrated with the GBP and where established in 2010 by the Climate 
Bond Initiative (Climate Bond Initiative, 2018a). The CBI is an international investor-focused 
non-profit organization established to mobilize the market for climate change solutions.  
2.3 The green bond market’s role and history  
ICMA (2018, p 2) defines the aim of the green bond market as “The green bond market aims 
to enable and develop the key role that debt markets can play in funding projects that 
contribute to environmental sustainability”. The development of the green bond market has 
 
4 The report is available at https://www.icmagroup.org/green-social-and-sustainability-bonds/green-bond-principles-gbp/ 
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rallied in later years due to an increased focus on the climate and thereby environmentally 
friendly investments.  
In the early 2000s before the establishment of the green bond market, the attention for climate 
change had been rising among investors. As a result, the PRI was established in 2006, with 
support from the United Nations (UN). Until 2019 approximately 2300 investors have signed 
to follow the principles (Principles of Responsible Investment, 2019). PRI aims to make 
investors and asset managers integrate ESG factors into their overall investment strategy. 
The pioneering bond of the green bond market was issued in 2007 by the European Investment 
Bank (European Investment Bank, 2019). The bond was the world's first Climate Awareness 
Bond and had an issue amount of EUR 600 million focusing on renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. One year later, after collaboration with SEB, the World Bank issued the world’s 
first labeled green bond. It raised an amount of 2.35 billion SEK, equivalent to USD 440 
million at that time (The World Bank, 2019). 
In the first years, only Multilateral Developments Banks issued green bonds. The tracking of 
the labeled green bond market started in 2009 when the Climate Bond Initiative5 (CBI) started 
tracking it (CBI, 2019a). Over the years, the market has developed, and in 2013-2014 
corporates and private banks entered the market, issuing their first green bonds (European 
Commission, 2016). Supporting this entry and the later development was the creation of the 
GBP in 2014. After the entry, there has been an exponential growth in issues volumes of green 
bonds, as seen from Figure 1.  
The growth has further been supported by the UN, which created the Sustainable Development 
Goals in 2015, climate action is one of the seventeen goals, and green bonds is one of many 
possible climate actions (United Nations Development Program, 2019 and United Nations, 
2019). The latest updated statistics from the CBI states that issuances aligned with CBI’s green 
bond definitions have increased past USD 200 billion and reached USD 211.4 billion as of 
21.10.2019.  
 
5 The Climate Bond Initiative is an international investor-focused non-profit organization established to mobilize the market 
for climate change solutions. 
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Figure 1: Annual green bonds issuings  
 
Figure 1 presents the global annual issuance amount of green bonds aligned with the standards of the 
CBI from 2008 to 21.10.2019; only externally reviewed bonds are counted. Source: CBI, 2018, authors’ 
calculations.  
 
Three world regions account for almost the entire issuance of reviewed green bonds. These 
regions are Europe, Asia-pacific, and North America, as seen in Figure 2. In 2018 
approximately 28 percent of the issuances came from Asia-pacific. While North-America held 
approximately 23% of the market, both their issuance amount and proportion of the total 
issuance amount decreased from 2017 to 2018. Europe has the highest proportion of the green 
bond issuances, and in 2018 it accounted for around 40 percent of the total global issuance 
volume. Statistics from CBI (2019b) show that approximately 85 percent of the proceeds move 
into energy-, building-, transport-, and water projects. CBI (2019b) also describes that 
financial corporates, asset-backed securities, non-financial corporates, development banks, 
and government-backed entities are the major groups of issuers.  
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Figure 2: Issuing levels of green bonds 
 
Figure 2 presents the development in issuance amount divided between the continents over the period 
2014 to 2018. Source: CBI 2019   
 
2.4 The Nordic green bond market 
The development of listed green bonds in the Nordics started in Norway in May 2010 when 
Kommunalbanken issued the first green bond in the Nordics (Climate Bond Initiative, 2018c). 
While Vasakonan, a Swedish real estate firm, issued the world's first-ever corporate green 
bond in 2013 (Vasakronan, 2018). The first municipal green bond was also issued that year by 
the city of Gothenburg (UNFCC, 2019).  
Sweden has been one of the frontrunners in the development of green bonds. The Swedish 
development is, among other things, a result of SEB’s central role in the creation of the first-
ever green bond, as mentioned in the past selection. Another explanation is the substantial 
focus on sustainability and the environment in Sweden. A consequence of this early adaption 
and focus is that the green bond market in Sweden has become, by far, the largest green bond 
market in the Nordics, as seen from Figure 3.  
The development of the green bond market in the rest of the Nordic countries has lagged that 
of the Swedish, as shown in Figure 3. The first green bonds in Denmark and Finland were 
issued in 2015 and 2016. However, these bonds were not listed (Climate Bond Initiative, 
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2018c). Furthermore, Iceland’s first green bond was issued as late as December 2018 (Nasdaq 
Nordic, 2018).  
In 2015, in the early days of the listed green bond market, Oslo Børs became the first stock 
exchange to launch a separate list for green bonds (Oslo Børs, 2019), facilitating green bond 
issuances in Norway. However, the development of the issue amount in the Norwegian green 
bond market has not had the same development as seen in the Swedish market.  
Figure 3: Yearly Issuance Amount Listed Green Bond in the Nordics 
 
Figure 3 shows the yearly issuance amount of listed green bonds in the Nordic market. The bars show both 
the issuance of the total issuance amount in the Nordic market and the amount of each country. The issuance 
amount for 2019 is the issuance amount until 07.11.2019. Source: Stamdata, Nasdaq Nordic, authors’ 
calculations.  
 
In Finland, Iceland, and Danmark, the green bond markets are still in a very early development 
stage. The Finnish market has no listed green bonds, but there have been a few issuances of 
non-listed municipal green bonds in 2018 and 2019 (Nasdaq Nordic, 2019). For the Icelandic 
market, the first green bond issuances took place in 2018, followed by two new issuances in 
2019. The first issuance of listed green bonds in the Danish market took place in 2019. Real 
estate has accounted for the majority of the green bond issuance amount from the beginning 
in 2013 until today, as shown in figure 4. However, the development of the Nordic green bond 
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markets has increased the diversity of firms issuing green bonds. Until now6, companies from 
eleven different industry groups have issued green bonds.  
Figure 4: Share of Green Bond Issuance Amount per Industry Group 
 
Figure 4 presents the share of the total issuance amount each industry group has contributed within each 
year after 2019. Source: Stamdata, Nasdaq Nordic, Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
6 Date: 21.10.2019 
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3. Literature Review 
With the exponential growth in the number of green bond issuances during the last couple of 
years, the number of research covering green bonds has also slowly increased. This section 
will present some of the previous studies conducted. The first part of this section will describe 
previous research on the relationship between environmental performance and the cost of 
financing. Then, previous research done on green bond premiums will be presented and 
discussed. 
3.1 Environmental performance and the cost of financing 
The relationship between a company's environmental profile and its financial performance is 
the subject of numerous studies. As the results from these studies vary a lot, no real consensus 
seems to have been reached. However, most of these studies seem to report a positive effect 
from CSR and ESG (in which environmental focus is an essential factor) on financial 
performance. The vast majority of these studies focus on the equity market, while studies 
investigating the debt market has historically been more limited.   
Kempf and Osthoff (2007) find that a high CSR score, on average, has a positive effect on the 
company's stock return. In their study, they construct a trading strategy that buys/sells stocks 
with high/low CSR scores and manage to achieve significant alphas. This positive effect from 
CSR on financial performance is also found by Sharman and Fernando (2008) in their study 
on US firms. They find that firms with high environmental performance tend to achieve lower 
volatility, reducing their equity cost of capital. Additionally, they suggest that firms with high 
environmental performance are more popular among equity investors, driving up the demand 
for these stocks, further lowering their equity cost of capital. Chava (2014) finds that investors 
require a higher expected return for stocks that are subject to environmental concerns, such as 
substantial emissions or hazardous chemicals, driving up the equity cost of capital   
In addition to the increase in the equity cost of capital, Chava (2014) finds that less 
environmentally friendly firms, on average, have to pay higher interest on their bank loans, 
increasing their cost of debt. Menz (2010) is one of the first to run research on how CSR affects 
bond yields. Surprisingly, in his study on European firms, he finds that socially responsible 
firms, on average, get a higher credit spread on their bonds, increasing the debt cost of capital. 
However, it is worth noting that as his results are just marginally significant, he suggests that 
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CSR not yet has been incorporated into the pricing of bonds. Oikonomou et al. (2014) find the 
opposite results in their study on US corporate bonds. Their findings suggest a negative 
relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and bond credit spread. A study on 
582 US firms, conducted by Bauer and Hann (2010), yields similar results. According to them, 
environmental concerns are associated with higher credit spreads, and therefore an increase in 
the debt cost of capital. Stellner et al. (2015) investigate Eurozone corporate bond yields and 
find only weak evidence that CSP reduces credit spreads. Additionally, their findings suggest 
that the relationship between CSP and bond credit spread highly depends on the country's ESG 
performance. 
The majority of the studies presented above seem to indicate that environmental performance 
has a positive effect on both equity- and debt cost of capital. However, it is essential to 
remember that this relationship, to a large degree, is determined by investor preferences. As 
these preferences vary over time, so can the relationship between environmental performance 
and cost of capital. Additionally, it is worth noting that these studies investigate if firms with 
an excellent environmental profile achieve a better cost of financing compared to less 
environmental friendly firms. These studies do not indicate whether there exists a price 
difference between green and conventional bonds from the same issuer. 
3.2 Current knowledge about the green bond premium  
As pointed out in the background section, green bonds are a rather new type of financial 
instrument. The number of green bonds outstanding has also been small. Hence previous 
studies investigating the price of green bonds relative to conventional bonds are limited. 
However, with the recent exponential growth in the number of green bonds, the amount of 
studies has also increased. These studies vary both in the method used, and in the results 
presented.   
Research conducted by the CBI (2019c) on a total of 61 EUR and USD denominated green 
bonds issued in the first half of 2019 finds that around 1/3 of these bonds experienced an 
oversubscription and a tighter spread compared to equivalent conventional bonds. These 
findings indicate the existence of a greenium in the primary market. The CBI (2019c) finds 
this difference in yield by comparing the green bonds with baskets of conventional bonds. The 
baskets are created by finding the most similar conventional bonds to that of the green bond. 
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Barclays (2015) uses a cross-sectional analysis where they regress the credit spreads on several 
explanatory variables explaining spread, including a dummy for green. Barclays (2015) 
studies the global green bond market and finds an average greenium of 17 bp in the secondary 
market in the period between March 2014 and August 2015. Barclays (2015) also find that the 
greenium has increased steadily over time.  
Zerbib (2019) analyze the existence of a greenium in the secondary market. He does so by 
using a matching methodology, in which he matches 135 investment grade fixed-rate bullet 
green bonds issued worldwide, with a conventional synthetic bond. The synthetic bond is 
based on two conventional bonds, with similar characteristics as the green bond. After 
controlling for differences in liquidity, he estimates the greenium by conducting a fixed effects 
regression. The greenium is defined as the time-invariant fixed effect. His findings suggest 
that overall, green bonds trade at a lower yield of -1.8 bp compared to conventional bonds. 
Additionally, Zerbib (2019) divides his full sample into subsamples based on the main 
characteristics of the bond. For some of the market segments, he finds no greenium. Hence, 
his findings suggest the estimated yield difference between green- and conventional bonds 
vary between different markets and industries.  
NN Investment Partners (2018) study the yield difference between labeled global investment-
grade green bonds and similar conventional bonds from the same issuer, having the same 
maturity and seniority as the green bond. They split their analysis into two parts: one where 
they study 67 green bonds in the period between December 2014 to May 2016, and one where 
they study 126 green bonds in the period between June 2016 and November 2017. For the first 
period, they find greenium equal to 1.1 bp. For the second period, they find a greenium of 0.7 
bp. Their results indicate that the absolute greenium has decreased over the years.   
Karpf and Mandel (2018) examine the yield term structures of 1880 US municipal green bonds 
and conventional municipal bonds from the same issuer, in the period between 2010 and 2016. 
They report that green bonds on average trade at a higher yield of 7.8 bp compared to 
conventional bonds, arguing that the green label seems to be penalized by investors. However, 
they also find that the yield difference went from positive to negative from 2015 and onwards. 
Ehlers and Packer (2017) examine the yield difference at issuance between 21 green bonds 
and conventional bonds from the same issuer. They document that these green bonds priced 
at a greenium of 18 bp relative to conventional bonds at issuance. They also examine yield 
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differences in the secondary market by comparing the return of green bond indices with global 
bond indices. To control for differences in currency composition between the two indices, they 
examine the hedged-returns. Ehlers and Packer (2017) find no statistically significant 
difference in secondary market returns between green bond indices and global bond indices.   
Larcker and Watts (2019) perform a study on 568 individual US municipal green bonds. They 
estimate the yield difference between the green bond and the most similar conventional bond 
issued on the same day by the same issuer. Larcker and Watts (2019) argue that the US 
municipal market is advantageous for this type of research because municipal issuers 
commonly issue loads of bonds at the same time, making it possible to match identical bonds 
which only differ by the green label. This characteristic makes it possible to control for 
maturity without matching each green bond with several conventional bonds. They find no 
evidence of a greenium in the US municipal bond market and state that investors are unwilling 
to sacrifice wealth to invest in environmental-friendly securities.    
As described, there is a vast variation in the estimated greenium in these previous studies, 
ranging from positive to negative values. The majority of the studies focus on the global green 
bond market, and there is only a defined number of studies on smaller market segments. This 
focus is, among other things, due to the limited amount of green bonds outstanding up until 
recent years, making analyses on some specific market segments difficult. Consequently, our 
study of the Nordic green bond markets will contribute to new and valuable insight into these 
markets.   
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4. Data retrieval, matching methodology, 
liquidity proxy, and data description 
Chapter 4 starts with elaborating on the data retrieval, the matching process, and the creation 
of the liquidity proxy. This elaboration will give an understanding of the construction of our 
data set. Lastly, the structure and descriptive statistics of our data are presented to give a clear 
understanding of what the data set looks like and what characteristics it contains. 
4.1 Data retrieval and cleaning 
The first step was to identify all green bonds issued in the Nordic markets from 2013 up until 
21.10.2016. Only listed green bonds were identified due to the need for regular liquidity and 
quoted bid and ask yields in our methodology. The rationale behind using bonds issued from 
2013 and onwards is that 2013 was the starting year of the corporate green bond market and 
the year when the issuance growth started rallying. Nordic issuers have issued green bonds 
listed on London Stock Exchange and other non-Nordic exchanges (CBI, 2018b). These bonds 
are not included as the scope of this thesis is to study the Nordic markets and thereby the 
Nordic stock exchanges.  
Another requirement for becoming a part of our green bond sample is that the green bond 
needs to have undertaken an external review. There are two primary reasons for this criterion. 
Firstly, all filtrable green bonds on Stamdata and Nasdaq Nordic are reviewed by third parties. 
Hence, finding the self-labeled green bonds is problematic, given our data-source. Secondly, 
as earlier mentioned, the green bond market is self-regulated, resulting in the possibility to 
self-label bonds as green with the intent to greenwash the company profile. In our belief, this 
threat is almost removed by excluding bonds without external reviews. Therefore the 
probability of finding a greenium between externally reviewed green bonds and conventional 
bonds, compared to a pool of both externally reviewed and self-labeled green bonds and 
regular bonds, should be higher. The rationale behind this belief is that an external review 
gives the green bond more credibility of actually being green, and not just a greenwashing 
item. 
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Initially, all externally reviewed green bonds (hereafter just referred to as green bonds) listed 
on the Nordic stock exchanges7 were identified using Stamdata filtering for green bonds. Then 
Nasdaq Nordic was used to find all green bonds listed on the Iceland Stock Exchange/Nasdaq 
Island (ICEX). This process resulted in findings of 217 green bonds from 72 different issuers. 
Of these bonds, 80 percent are denoted in SEK while approximately 15 percent in NOK, 1 
percent in DKK, 2 percent in Euro, and 1 percent ISK. The majority of the green bonds are, 
as expected, listed on Nasdaq Stockholm. For a view of the full sample of the different issuers, 
amounts, and the number of bonds, see Appendix Figure A3. 
After the retrieval of the green bonds, all conventional bonds in the Nordics were retrieved 
from Stamdata. From that sample, the detection of all bonds issued by the same issuers and in 
the same period as the green bonds where done filtering on issuers and time. Lastly, the 
combination of these samples was completed to enable the matching procedure of the green 
and conventional bonds creating our triplets8. In the find the best matches, all bonds were 
sorted on characteristics such as issuer, maturity date, issue amount, coupon size, among other 
things to combine the most efficient triplets following our matching criteria, which will be 
described further in selection 4.2.  
Subsequent to matching the triplets, daily bid- and ask-yields for all bonds in our matched 
sample from their issue date until 21.10.2019 were retrieved, with the use of Bloomberg 
Terminal. Then a merging of the yield observations with their respective bonds was done. 
Lastly, all dates where one or more of the bonds in a triplet were missing a yield observation 
was removed from all bonds in the respective triplet. The preference for daily yield 
observations is due to the relatively recent issuances for many of the bonds in our sample. 
Hence, using daily data will give a better view of the difference in yield and liquidity between 
the green- and conventional bonds. However, using daily data might impose some challenges 
because of low liquidity in the Nordic bond markets. Thereby, the low liquidity might infer 
yield observations that deviate from the real market value. As a robustness test of our results, 
 
7 Nordic stock exchanges: Nordic ABM (ABM), Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), Stockholm Stock Exchange/Nasdaq Stockholm 
(OMX), Copenhagen Stock Exchange/Nasdaq Copenhagen (KFX), Nordic Derivatives Exchange (XNDX), First North 
Sweden (FNSE), and Helsinki Stock Exchange/Nasdaq Helsinki (HEX); 
8 A triplet is a group of bond consisting of two conventional bonds and one green bond. These are matched to create a 
synthetical conventional bond which is similar to the green bond in all aspects except for the greenness.  
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the fixed effects regression, described in Selection 5.1, is also conducted with weakly and 
monthly observations.    
4.2 Matching Method 
As described earlier, green bonds are a relatively new type of financial instrument. Hence, 
previous research on green bond premiums in the secondary market is still relatively limited. 
A small selection of different methods has previously been conducted, with various strengths 
and weaknesses. One possible method to try to identify a greenium would be to use an OLS 
regression similar to the one used by Barclays (2015). However, not managing to include all 
relevant variables would make the regression biased, leading to misleading results. 
Additionally, because yield observations are not independent of each other, such a method can 
have biases.  
Avoiding omitted variable biases can be done with a matching methodology. Here all green 
bonds are matched with conventional bonds that are similar in all aspects except for the green 
label. Hence, this method is preferred because it allows us to ignore all variables that do not 
differ between the green and the conventional bonds. The matching method is known as a 
quantitative model-free approach, and it is previously applied for assessing a potential green 
premium by Zerbib (2019) and Larcker & Watts (2019). It has also been used to investigate 
potential additional returns of ethical funds (Kreander et al. (2005) and Renneboog et al. 
(2008)), and to investigate the costs of liquidity (Helwege et al. (2014)). 
Matching can be done by matching a green bond with one or more conventional bonds. 
Helwege et al. (2014) and Larcker & Watts (2019) have matched each green bond with one 
conventional bond. In Larcker & Watts (2019), this method is suitable because they study the 
American municipality market where a group of bonds is issued at the same time with the 
same maturity from the same issuer. Hence, they can match exactly on all characteristics and 
isolate the effect of the green label completely. However, in our bond sample, very few bonds 
are issued by the same issuers on the same dates. Therefore, matching just one conventional 
bond with each green bond would create a maturity bias, which is the case in Helwege et al. 
(2014). To avoid the occurrence of such a bias, the method used in this thesis is similar to 
Zerbib (2019), where each green bond is matched with two conventional bonds. Further, 
having two conventional bonds for each green bond makes it possible to combine the 
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conventional matches into a synthetic conventional bond with the same maturity as the green 
bond.  
Optimally the green bonds and the conventional matches should be equal in all characteristics 
except that one is green and the conventional bonds are not. However, liquidity is impossible 
to match precisely. Additionally, it is troublesome to accurately match the maturity date, issue 
date, issue size, and coupon size while at the same time, get a sufficiently large data sample. 
Therefore, to get a sufficiently big sample while still getting reliable results, various 
restrictions on the difference between the matched bonds have been imposed.  
The matching restrictions used in this thesis is similar to the restrictions used in Zerbib (2019). 
Potential conventional bond matches need to be issued by the same issuer, with identical 
currency, seniority, high yield/investment grade, sector, bond structure, collateral, and coupon 
type as their respective green bond matches. In terms of maturity, a restriction for conventional 
bonds is imposed. The conventional bond matches can mature at most two years before or two 
years after the green bond. These restrictions will make the estimated yield for the synthetical 
bond more accurate.  
As mentioned, it is not possible to match the liquidity of the different bonds exactly. However, 
it is critical to control for difference in liquidity, because it can affect the yield of a bond (Chen 
et al. (2007), Beber et al. (2009), Bao et al. (2011), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), de Jong & 
Driessen (2012)). Therefore, various restrictions are imposed on the issue date and issue 
amount similar to Zerbib (2019). In addition, a limitation on the allowed variation in the 
coupon level is set as a requirement. These restrictions let us control for some of the liquidity 
bias, as bonds’ liquidity can partly be controlled through the mentioned bond characteristics 
(Bao et al. (2011) and Houweling et al. (2005), Helwege et al. (2014)). Further, these 
restrictions will make our results more reliable as there is less residual liquidity to control for 
by our bid-ask spread liquidity proxy, which will be described in selection 4.7.  
The first restriction is that the issue date of the conventional bonds should not be greater than 
six years before or six years after the green bond. While the issue amount of the conventional 
bonds cannot be more(less) than four times (one fourth) of the issue amount of the green bond, 
furthermore, the current coupon size must be within a range of plus/minus 80 basis points. In 
the matching process, the two conventional bonds that match the respective green bond best 
and fulfill all our criteria are chosen. This process resulted in a loss of 139 green bonds, leaving 
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us with a sample of 77 triplets containing as many green bonds and 154 conventional bonds. 
A further description of the final sample is conducted in selection 4.6.  
4.3 Removing maturity bias  
Removing maturity bias is done by combining the two conventional bonds in each triplet to 
create a synthetic conventional bond with the same maturity date as their green match. This 
process is done in the same way as Zerbib (2019), by linear interpolation or extrapolation of 
the conventional bonds ask-yields9 at the green bonds' maturity date. Extrapolation is used 
when the green bond mature either before or after both the conventional bonds. While 
interpolation is conducted when one of the conventional bonds mature before the green bond, 
and the other conventional bond matures after the green bond10. 
Inter- and extrapolation is here a reliable solution because the yield curve is generally assumed 
to be monotonic, and generally increasing. Additionally, a linear approach is efficient as the 
triplets contain bonds that have maturity dates in close proximity. Hence, a possible deviation 
due to the linear approximation should be close to nothing. For a further discussion about the 
strengths and weaknesses of our method, see Selection 7.2. The following formula is used 
when extrapolating/interpolating:  
 
(1)                       𝑦~𝐵 = 𝑦𝐵1 +
𝑦𝐵2−𝑦𝐵1
𝑋𝐵2−𝑋𝐵1
∗ (𝑋𝐺 − 𝑋𝐵1) 
 
where:  
• y~B: Conventional synthetic bond ask yield 
• yB1: Conventional bond 1 ask yield 
• yB2: Conventional bond 2 ask yield 
• XG: Days until maturity green bond 
 
9 Ask-yields are preferred in our thesis because it investigates investors demand and preferences for green bonds and they 
buy at the ask price and thereby get the return of the ask yield.  
10 See Appendix Figure A1a and A1b for illustrative figures of extra- and interpolating. 
 30
• XB1: Days until maturity conventional bond 1 
• XB2: Days until maturity conventional bond 2 
 
The rationale behind using ask-yield is, as mentioned in the footnote, to study investor's 
demand for green bonds, thereby, what they must pay for a green bond compared with a 
conventional bond. Other possible solutions would be to look at the bid-yield or the average 
of the bid- and ask-yields. However, using the ask yield should not have any practical effects 
on our results because the bid-ask spread of the green and conventional bonds are practically 
equal for both the conventional- and the green bonds11. 
4.4 Liquidity proxy  
Numerous studies are investigating whether investors get compensated for holding relatively 
illiquid securities. Friewald et al. (2012) examine whether liquidity affects bond yields by 
analyzing more than 20 000 US corporate bonds, using several different liquidity proxies. 
They find that liquidity explains as much as 14 % of the corporate bond yield changes. Lin et 
al. (2011) use both the Pastor-Stambaugh12 and Amihud13 measures as liquidity proxies in 
their research on corporate bond yields. Their findings suggest the existence of a statistically 
significant liquidity premium. It is, therefore, necessary to control for the residual difference 
in liquidity between bonds. Houweling et al. (2005) argue that the issue date and the issue 
amount are suitable measures for bond liquidity. Since restrictions are set on the difference in 
issue amount, issue date, and coupon level within the triplets during the matching process, 
some of the potential differences in liquidity are already removed.  
Further, to control for the residual liquidity difference, which is the difference not captured 
during the matching process, a liquidity proxy is included in our regression model. As in 
 
11 As the bid-ask spread of the green and conventional bonds are practically equal this choice shall not affect our results, 
because using bid-yields or the average of the bid- and ask-yield will give the same results. See selection 4.6, for a descriptive 
statistics of the bid-ask yields of the bonds.   
12 The Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity measure captures temporary price changes linked to order flow. This measure relies on the 
principle that order flow generate greater return reversal when liquidity is lower.  
13 The Amihud liquidity measure focuses on how trades affect prices. According to this measure the liquidity for a given 
security is high if a large volume of that particular security can be traded with little impact on the the price. 
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Zerbib (2019), this thesis uses the difference in bid-ask spread between the green bond and the 
synthetic bond as a liquidity proxy. Fong et al. (2017) argue that the bid-ask spread is the most 
accurate liquidity proxy for this type of research. The bid-ask spread has been broadly used as 
a liquidity proxy in previous studies, such as Dick-Nilsen et al. (2012) and Chen et. Al. (2007)         
First, the bid-ask spread for the synthetic conventional bonds was calculated. The spread is 
computed by taking the bid-ask spreads of the two conventional bonds and weighting them 
based on the difference between their and the green bond’s maturity date. A distance weighted 
estimation is preferred over extrapolation in the calculation of the synthetic bid-ask spread due 
to the implicit assumption of a linear relationship between the bid-ask spread and maturity 
when extrapolating. While the distance weighting approach lays most weight to the bond that 
has the closest maturity to the green bond. This method should yield sufficient precision as the 
spreads between the two conventional bonds in each triplet is small, see Section 4.7. Therefore, 
and similar to Zerbib(2019), the following equation is used to make the synthetic bid-ask 
spread: 
(2)                       𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
~𝐵 =  
𝑑2
𝑑1 + 𝑑2
∗  𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐵1 +  
𝑑1
𝑑1 + 𝑑2
∗  𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐵2 
 
Where: 
𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐵1 and 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐵2 are the bid-ask yield spreads for conventional bond i 1 and 2  at time t. 
and  
d1 = |Green bond maturity - CB1 maturity|  
d2 = |Green bond maturity - CB2 maturity|  
When the bid-ask spreads for the conventional synthetic bonds (𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
~𝐶𝐵) is created, the 
liquidity proxy, used in our regression model in Selection 5.1, is estimated. The liquidity proxy 
is defined as the difference in bid-ask spread between the green- and synthetic bond:  
(3)                       ∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐵 − 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
~𝐶𝐵 
 
where 𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐵  is the bid-ask yield spread for green bond i at time t. 
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4.5 Defining the yield spread 
After matching each conventional synthetic yield to its respective green bond yield, the daily 
yield difference between the green bond and the conventional synthetic bond was calculated. 
Calculations are done by subtracting the ask-yield of the conventional synthetic bond from the 
green bond’s ask yield. The yield difference is defined as:  
(4)                       ∆?̃?𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐵 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
~𝐶𝐵 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝐺𝐵 and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
~𝐶𝐵 is the green- and the conventional synthetic bond i’s ask yield on day t.  
Our data sample may contain possible errors from Stamdata, Bloomberg Terminal, or our data 
handling, e.g., inter-/extrapolation. As seen from Figure 5, there are a few extreme outliers in 
the dataset.  To control for the effect of spurious outliers and make sure they are not passed on 
to the analysis a winsorization of the estimated yield difference, ∆?̃?𝑖,𝑡, is obtained at the 0,5
th 
and 99,5th percentile.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Yield difference distribution 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the yield difference between the green- and conventional bonds. ∆Yield is 
expressed in basis points. 
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4.6 Data description 
There is a total of 21614 green bonds listed on the Nordic stock exchanges, including Iceland. 
Use of the matching criteria given in selection 4.2 resulted in 77 matched triplets containing 
as many green bonds and 154 conventional bonds. Of the 154 conventional bonds, 117 are 
unique. Hence, some conventional bonds are used to match several green bonds. As the 
conventional synthetic bonds are extrapolated/interpolated at the green bonds’ maturity, all 
synthetic yields are modified to their respective green matches. Using the most similar 
conventional bonds in this process will give the best results, even though it leads to the use of 
some conventional in more than one match.   
As Table 1 shows, our dataset started with 72 unique Nordic green bond issuers. In the 
matching process, the number of issuers shrunk to 29 issuers. The currency dominating our 
sample is Swedish Krona (SEK). Seventy-one of the triplets are denominated in SEK, and just 
six triplets are denominated in NOK. Hence, all bonds from Finland, Denmark, and Island are 
lost. This fact is not surprising as there are very few listed green bonds in those markets. Also, 
worth noting is the fact that 72 of our triplets contain investment grade bonds, while just five 
have high yield bonds. 
Furthermore, the majority of our triplets are formed of bonds issued by real estate companies, 
are in the risk class senior unsecured, and have a floating coupon. These characteristics are 
equal for both the green bonds and their matched conventional bonds. However, some traits 
vary between the green- and conventional bonds, namely issue date, maturity date, maturity 
length, and issue amount, which are going to be further elaborated in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Icelandic green bonds are not included in the Nordic universe in the further description, as they are not on Stamdata. Not 
including them in the description should not give any bias for the description of the Nordic green bond universe because there 
are only three Icelandic green bonds.  
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Table 1: Sample construction and composition 
 
Table 1 Panel A shows the number of listed green bonds in the Nordics (except Iceland) and how many of 
these we have used. Further, it shows how many conventional bonds we have used to match the green bonds. 
Panel B shows the composition of our combined dataset and how our bonds are divided into different 
groups. 
 
Understood from the previous paragraph and Table 1 is that most of the different dimensions 
have one category that contains a large percentage of the total number of triplets. These 
categories are SEK denominated-, investment grade-, senior unsecured-, floating coupon-, and 
real estate bonds. As a result, the mentioned categories contain many of the same triplets. An 
overview is presented in Table 2. It shows how many triplets that are present in two different 
categories.  
Most categories contain a high number of SEK and investment grade triplets, which is as 
expected due to the that almost all triplets are SEK denominated and investment grade rated. 
The investment grade and SEK categories hold a high degree of the same triplets. Hence, it 
can be expected that they are yielding similar results in terms of greenium. Section 6.2 is going 
to analyze this expectation. However, there are fewer triplets that occur in all the major 
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categories, 31 in total. Therefore it is reasonable to believe that the greenium may vary more 
between other categories than it does between investment grade and SEK.         
Table 2: Matrix of the number of triplets in the different categories 
 
Table 2 presents a matrix of how many of the same triplets which are used in the same subsamples both in 
absolute numbers and in % overlap. The diagonal, marked in grey, represents the total number of triplets 
in each category. The percentage numbers in each row are the percentage overlap between two categories 
and the total number of triplets in the category on the left column. In other words, the total of observations 
that are in both categories divided by the total number of triplets in the category. The number shows how 
many triplets that are present in both categories.       
4.7 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3, Panel- A, and B presents various descriptive statistics characterizing the green- and 
conventional bonds. While Panel D shows the difference between the green bonds and the 
conventional bonds individually. Lastly, Panel E shows the difference between the green bond 
and the average of the two conventional bonds. Additionally, a Wilcoxen signed-rank test is 
conducted to determine if some features are significantly different between the green- and 
conventional bonds. 
Some characteristics vary between the green bond sample and the matched conventional bond 
sample. First, the mean (median) issue amount for the SEK and NOK denoted green bonds are 
SEK 553 (500) million and NOK 813 (450) million. While for the non-green bonds, it is SEK 
469 (500) million and NOK 813 (500) million. Further, the mean issue date has an approximate 
difference of five months. However, most characteristics are very similar, as the current 
coupon level, maturity date, bid-ask spread, and maturity length have similar characteristics 
in both samples. 
As Panel E shows, the issue amount of the average the two conventional bonds in each triplet 
divided on their respective green bond is not statistically significant from one. Hence, there is 
no systematic difference in the issue amount between the green bond sample and the 
conventional bond sample. The similarity in the issue amount can also be seen from Panel D. 
However when investigating SEK denominated triplets, a significant difference is found. 
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Green bonds have, on average, an issue amount which is SEK 83 million higher than the 
conventional bonds. This difference indicates that the SEK denominated green bonds have a 
systematically higher issue amount compared to the average issue amount of their 
conventional matches.   
Another finding is that the maturity date of the green bonds, on average, is 79 days after that 
of the conventional bonds. This difference is removed in the synthetic bonds by using inter- 
and extrapolation, as described in Section 4.3. Further, the issue date is also different as the 
green bonds are on average issued 139 days after their conventional matches. However, the 
maturity length of the different bonds is not significantly different from each other. The 
differences in some of our bond characteristics may have some influence on our results. 
However, the differences are relatively small in economic terms, and most are on 
characteristics that affect the liquidity of our bonds. As liquidity is controlled for in the first 
step of our fixed effect regression, the differences should not bias our results.   
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
  
 
Table 3 Panel A presents bond characteristics from our matched green bond sample, while Panel B shows 
the same characteristics for the matched conventional bond sample. While the differences between the 
green- and conventional bond samples are presented in Panel C. Lastly, Panel D presents the difference 
between the green bond sample and the combined conventional bond sample. Also, there is a Wilcoxon test 
conducted to see if there are significant differences between the two bond samples. 
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A presentation of the bid-ask spread summary statistics is shown in Table 4. The different bid-
ask spreads of the different bonds in each triplet has a very similar mean, median, and standard 
deviation. Hence, the restrictions imposed to control for liquidity in our matching criteria have 
worked well. Another finding is that the mean ∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡, which is the difference between the bid-
ask spread of the green bond and the synthetic matched bond is -0,028 basis points. In 
economic terms, that is essentially zero. From these results, it can be interpreted that the bid-
ask spread is equally wide for both the synthetic- and green bonds. Consequently, the findings 
described in chapter 5 should be the same regardless of the yield used, namely ask-yield, bid-
yield, or an average between the bid- and ask yields. A plot of the distribution of ∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is 
presented in Appendix Figure A2.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics bid-ask spreads 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the bid-ask yields of the bonds in our dataset. All numbers are 
shown in percentage points except N, which describes the number of observations. ∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the difference 
between the bid-ask difference of the green bond and the conventional synthetic bond.     
 
The mean ask-yield of the green bond is 0,3999 percentage points, while the median is 0,2280 
percentage points, which is higher than the ask-yield of both the conventional matches. Table  
5 presents an overview of these yields. After interpolating/extrapolating the conventional 
bonds into synthetic bonds, the mean and median ask-yield has risen slightly above that of the 
green bonds. These results might be an indication of a greenium, but the liquidity proxy is not 
included as a control yet. Therefore, concluding on a greenium is too early. 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics ask-yields 
Table 5 shows the ask yields of the green matched green bonds and the synthetic conventional bonds in our 
sample in addition to the difference between the yield of the green- and synthetic bonds, ∆?̃?𝑖,𝑡. Numbers are 
presented in percentage points. 
  
Mean Median SD Min p25% p75% Max N
(%) 0,09418 0,10000 0,02333 0,00000 0,08700 0,10000 0,36000 29629
(%) 0,09446 0,09958 0,02626 0,00000 0,08433 0,10000 0,93661 29629
(%) -0,00028 0,00000 0,01876 -0,83911 -0,00100 0,00028 0,26813 29629
Mean Median SD Min p25% p75% Max
(%) 0,39990 0,22800 0,61599 -0,55800 -0,01700 0,62800 3,64500
(%) 0,40490 0,23498 0,62175 -0,97400 -0,01684 0,64100 3,50488
(%) -0,00028 0,00000 0,01876 -0,83911 -0,00100 0,00109 0,26813
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Contrary to Zerbib (2019), our thesis includes both fixed- and floating coupon bonds, which 
might lead to different findings than his. A visual test to see if the distribution of the fixed-rate 
bonds and floating-rate bonds differ from each other is, therefore, conducted to see if this 
should make a difference between the findings. Figure 6 presents the plot.  
The plot shows that both fixed and floating- coupon bonds have approximately the same 
distribution. However, the distribution of yield differences for floating coupon bonds is wider 
than for fixed coupon bonds. These findings are as expected because our sample consists of a 
higher number of floating- than fixed coupon bonds, especially before 2018. As there has been 
issued more bonds of both coupon types and the relative difference in the number of bonds 
have decreased, and the variance between them has also decreased. Hence, the results should 
be approximately equal for the bonds with fixed- and floating coupons. It is, therefore, 
expected that this difference should not produce significant differences between our findings 
and that of Zerbib (2019). However, this statement will be analyzed further in the subsampling 
in Selection 6.2.  
Also worth noting is that over the time period, the yield difference between the bonds has 
increased, as seen by the width of the plot. This increase is not surprising as the number of 
triplets has increased in later years, and thereby increasing the number of observations. When 
the variation is held constant, and the number of observations has increased the width of the 
plot increases. 
Figure 6: Distribution of the yield difference for fixed- and floating coupon 
bonds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of yield difference of the bonds with fixed coupons and floating (FRN) 
coupons. ∆Yield is expressed in basis points. Source: Bloomberg, Stamdata, Authors calculations  
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4.8 Sample Comparison: All green bonds and our green 
sample 
As mentioned earlier, our matched sample consists of 77 triplets resulting in 77 green bonds. 
The Nordic green bond universe, not including bonds on Iceland, consists of 213 green bonds. 
Consequently, a large proportion of the total Nordic green bond universe is dropped. Further, 
our selection of green bonds is not made up of a random draw because all matches that fulfill 
our matching criteria are included. Therefore, a comparison of our sample and the Nordic 
universe of green bonds is conducted to consider if our findings can be generalized for the 
whole Nordic bond market. For the full list of the matched sample, see appendix figure A5. 
Table 6 shows sample characteristics of the full Nordic listed green bond sample and our 
matched green bonds. Additionally, a test15 is conducted to determine whether they are 
statistically different. The full population has a mean issue date 135 days after that of the 
matched sample, but the difference is not statistically significant. Neither are the differences 
in issue amounts and coupon types. Nevertheless, many characteristics differ significantly 
between the two samples, as maturity date and maturity length. The full sample has a maturity 
date with a mean which is 261 days after that of our sample, while the length of the bonds in 
the full sample is, on average, over four months longer than the green bonds in our sample. 
The current coupon is also higher for the full sample than for our sample. Maturity length and 
coupon levels affect the duration of a bond. Hence, there can be a difference in duration and 
thereby variation in pricing between our sample and the population.  
There is also a difference between the seniority in the samples. The matched sample has a high 
percentage of senior unsecured bonds and few of the other types, while the population has a 
more diverse spread between the different types of seniority. Additionally, there is an observed 
difference between the distribution of bonds in different industry groups. The matched sample 
has a tilt toward real estate and away from utilities and industry compared to the population.  
 
15 The difference is tested by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing the mean of the total sample with the mean of our 
sample. The Wilcoxon test it preferred over a vanilla t-test as the data is not normally distributed, which is tested through a 
Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test. 
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Further, our sample only consists of bonds issued in NOK and SEK, while the population also 
has bonds denoted in DKK and Euro. Lastly, it is reasonable to believe that our sample, on 
average, contains larger companies than the average of the total population. This is because 
the matching process requires two conventional bonds from the same issuer to match one green 
bond. In addition, the matches must satisfy our matching criteria. Then firms with a higher 
number of bonds, which usually correlate with firm size, have an elevated probability of 
getting included in our sample. However, this is not tested between the samples, but would be 
consistent with the findings of Larcker and Watts (2019). 
As described, our green bonds and the population differs in several aspects. Because there are 
few green bonds in both Finland and Denmark in the population, and none of them are in the 
matched sample, our results cannot be generalized to all Nordic green bond markets. The 
systematic differences between our matched sample and the total population in the non-
country specific aspects such as the coupon rate, seniority, industry group, reduces our ability 
to generalize our result to all green bonds in Norway and Sweden. However, our results can 
be taken as an indication of what might be valid for the whole population.  
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Table 6: Comparison of the full green bond sample and the matched green bond 
sample 
Table 6 compare our matched green bond sample with the full Nordic green bond sample (except the 
Icelandic bonds) on various characteristics. Column (1)-(2) shows the difference between the full- and 
matched green bond samples, it is also conducted a Wilcoxon test to see if there is a significant difference 
between the samples. Note: *p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01 
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5. Empirical Methodology 
The methodology chapter will present and describe the methods used in this analysis. First, 
section 5.1 will present the fixed effect regression model used to capture the potential 
greenium. Secondly, section 5.2 will explain how the subsamples are constructed and how it 
will be used to investigate potential differences in the greenium in different types of bonds. At 
last, section 5.3 will present the OLS regressions used to estimate the determinants of the 
greenium. 
5.1 Regression model  
As in Zerbib (2019), a fixed effect (FE) regression model is used to retrieve the bond specific 
greenium. The regression model used in our thesis, similar to the one used by Zerbib (2019), 
is defined as:   
(5)                       ∆?̃?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽∆𝐵𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
The dependent variable, ∆?̃?𝑖,𝑡, is defined as the difference in ask-yield between the green bond 
i and the conventional synthetic bond i at time t. To control for differences in liquidity, a 
liquidity proxy is included, ∆BAi,t as the explanatory variable with β as the coefficient. The 
time-invariant FE, Pi, represents the bond specific greenium. In other words, this approach will 
estimate one greenium for each of the 77 bond pairs.  
An FE regression model is preferred in this research as it allows us to capture the unobserved 
effect of a green label on the bond yield, without imposing restrictions on distribution or 
including additional information about the bonds in our dataset. Secondly, using FE regression 
is preferred as it, under the strict exogeneity assumption, does not require the unobserved time-
invariant effect to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variable in all time periods 
(Wooldridge, 2015).  
A Hausman-test is conducted to verify if an FE estimation is preferred over a random effect 
(RE) estimation. The results indicate that the FE and RE yield similar estimates, but that the 
estimation of the RE will be more efficient. However, for the RE to be relevant, one must truly 
believe that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all of the explanatory variables. 
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Wooldridge (2015) argues that in many panel data methods, the data is not a result of a random 
draw from a large population. If that is true, FE estimation should be used instead of RE. 
Because our research aims to isolate the bond specific greenium by allowing a different 
intercept for each bond, and because our data is not a result of a random draw but a matched 
sample, this thesis uses an FE estimation. 
To test whether FE estimation is preferred over pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
several tests; an F-test, a Honda test, a Wooldridge test, and a Lagrange Multiplier test 
(Breusch-Pagan test); are performed, all with a null hypothesis that there exists no individual 
effect. In all these tests, the null hypothesis is rejected at the one percent significance level. 
The low p-values16 retrieved from these tests indicate that our data is highly incompatible with 
a model without individual effects. Hence, an FE estimation is preferred. Table 7 presents the 
results from the Hausmann-test and the tests for individual effects. 
Table 7: Hausmann-test, and tests for individual effects 
Table 7 shows the p-value from the Hausmann-test, F-test, Honda-test, Lagrange/Breusch-Pagan-test, and 
Wooldridge-test. 
 
OLS standard errors are only unbiased when the residuals are independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d). A violation of the i.i.d assumption can lead to either an overestimation or 
underestimation of the true variability of the coefficients (Petersen, 2009). To test if this 
assumption holds in our model, a control for heteroscedasticity is conducted by implementing 
a Breusch- Pagan test. The results indicate the existence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. 
A Wooldridge test, a Breusch-Pagan test, and a Durbin Watson test are also applied. All these 
tests indicate that the residuals are serially correlated. Results from these tests are presented in 
table 8.  
 
16  2.2e-16 is the smallest number larger than 0 than can be stored by the floating system in R studio 
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Table 8: Robustness tests on the fixed effect regression (specification (5))  
Table 8 shows the p-value from the Breusch-Pagan test, Breusch-Godfrey test, Durbin Watson test, and 
Wooldridge test. 
Newey-West robust standard errors are estimated to address the problem of heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. Petersen (2009) finds that in the case of both cross-sectional dependence 
and time-series dependence, Newey-West robust standard errors can still be biased. Therefore, 
similar to Zerbib (2019), Beck-Katz robust estimators are used, as Beck and Katz (1995) find 
that their robust standard error estimator works well in small panel data samples.    
In specification (5) the bonds´ ask yields are used in both the dependent variable,∆?̃?𝑖,𝑡, and in 
the independent variable, ∆BAi,t. In the independent variable, ask yields are only used 
indirectly, as this variable is defined by equation (2) and (3). Hence, the dependent and the 
independent variable is not necessarily correlated. Conducting a correlation analysis tests this 
and Table 9 presents the results. Because of a low correlation of -0.055, it should not be 
problematic to use the ask yields in both the dependent- and independent variables.  
Table 9: Correlation analysis between ∆?̃?𝑖,𝑡 and ∆BAi,t 
Table 9 presents the Pearson correlation coefficient for the correlation analysis between the dependent 
variable,∆?̃?𝑖,𝑡 , and the independent variable, ∆BAi,t. 
5.2 Subsampling 
In order to identify if potential greenium varies between different types of bonds, the data set 
is divided into subsamples based on the main characteristics of the bond. For each of the 
isolated subsamples, the mean and median greenium is calculated. A Shapiro-Wilk normality 
test is conducted to test the normality assumption in each of the subsamples. The Shapiro-
Wilk normality test is preferred as it has the highest power17, especially in the cases of 
relatively small sample sizes (Yap and Sim (2011). 
 
17 Power is one of the most frequent used normality test measures (Ghasemi and Zahediasl, 2012)   
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In all subsamples, the normality assumption is violated. Therefore, a non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test is used to test whether the estimated greenium is significantly different from 
zero. This test is a useful substitute for the student t-test when there is a violation of the normal 
distribution assumption (Whitley and Ball, 2002). Since there is little point in running such a 
test on the mean of small samples, only subsamples consisting of eight or more pairs are tested. 
The dataset is divided between the following characteristics: Industry group, Currency, 
Coupon type, High Yield/Investment Grade, Risk type, and Issue Amount.   
5.3 Determinants of the greenium 
In the first part of the analysis, the estimated greeniums is isolated using an FE regression. In 
this part, an examination of different bond characteristics and their explanatory power of the 
potential greeniums. A linear OLS regression is conducted to identify possible determinants 
of the potential greenium. The regression regresses the isolated greenium on the different bond 
characteristics. Zerbib (2019) uses the same method, but our research differs in some of the 
explanatory variables included. Our research uses other variables mainly because our 
descriptive data is collected using Stamdata, which presents different bond characteristics 
compared to Bloomberg, used in Zerbib (2019). Additionally, some of the variables included 
by Zerbib (2019) is irrelevant in our thesis as it only focuses on the Nordic market, while 
Zerbib (2019) examines the global market. 
(6)  𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗1𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗
𝑁
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦−1
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝐻𝑌/𝐼𝐺𝑗1𝐻𝑌/𝐼𝐺𝑗
𝑁
𝐻𝑌/𝐼𝐺−1
𝑗=1 +
∑ 𝛽3,𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦1𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗
𝑁
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦−1
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽6log (𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖 
 
(7)  𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1,𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗1𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗
𝑁
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦−1
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽2,𝐻𝑌
𝐼𝐺 𝑗
1𝐻𝑌
𝐼𝐺 𝑗
𝑁
𝐻𝑌
𝐼𝐺
−1
𝑗=1 +
∑ 𝛽3,𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗
𝑁
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝−1
𝑗=1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 
𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽6log (𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Two regression models are constructed and defined by specification (6) and (7).  In both of 
our specifications, the estimated 77 greeniums are regressed on currency, coupon type, issue 
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amount (in SEK), maturity, High yield vs. Investment grade, and the coupon rate (at 
21.10.2019). In specification (6), the seniority of the bond is also included. While in the 
specification (7), industry grouping is instead chosen as an explanatory variable. They are not 
included in the same model due to the high correlation between the industry group and 
seniority. Because of the high correlation between the seniority and industry group, these 
variables are not included in the same model. Both specifications use the logarithm of the issue 
amount in SEK to linearize the values and get a relative change in the dependent variable. 
Since variation in the explanatory variables is needed to run the regression, qualitative variable 
modalities with only one observation are not included in the regressions. Hence,   
“municipality” bonds, which is a modality of the Seniority variable is not included. Also,  
“Industry”, “Customer Services” and “Pulp, paper, and forestry” bonds, which are modalities 
of the variable Industry group is removed. 
A Breusch Pagan-test indicates heteroscedasticity in the residuals. To address this problem, 
robust standard errors are used. The variance inflation factors (VIF) is calculated for both 
specifications, to check for multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. A rule of 
thumb often used in practice is that a VIF >10 indicates that multicollinearity is a “problem” 
(Wooldridge, 2015 & Houweling et al., 2005). Based on the relatively low VIF values, 
multicollinearity between our variables seems not to be a problem in neither of the 
specifications. The results from both the Breusch Pagan-test and the calculated VIFs are 
presented in Table 10. 
Table 10: Results from tests on specifications (6) and (7) 
Table 10 shows the results from the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) to test for multicollinearity in specifications (6) and (7).  
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6. Results 
This section will present the results from the FE model defined by specification (5). Following, 
it will go through the subsampling, looking at whether there exists a difference in the yield 
between green- and conventional bonds in the different subsamples. Lastly, this section will 
present the results from the OLS regressions defined by specification (6) and (7), where the 
estimated yield difference is regressed on different characteristics of the bond in an attempt to 
capture determinants of the greenium. 
6.1 Estimated Greenium 
The results from the FE estimation defined by specification (5), is presented in Table 11. The 
estimated liquidity control- coefficient (∆BA) equals -0.416 and is statistically significant at 
the one percent level for both the standard within regression and the estimated robust standard 
error estimations. Our results indicate that a one bp increase in the Bid-Ask spread between 
the green and the synthetic bond is associated with a 0.416 bp decrease in the yield difference 
between the green and the synthetic bond. Our coefficient results are identical in direction but 
differ in magnitude to what is found by Zerbib (2019), who finds a coefficient estimate of 
-9.88.   
Similar to Zerbib (2019), our model has a low R-square of 1.1 percent, indicating that our 
liquidity proxy explains little of the total variation in yield difference. However, the liquidity 
proxy coefficient is highly significant. Therefore, it should not be left out. The key idea behind 
the matching method is that all of the differences in yield not explained by the potential 
greenium are already controlled for, leaving the greenium to account for the rest of the 
variation in yield difference between green and conventional bonds. Hence, the R-square is 
not of much relevance here.  
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Table 11: Results from the fixed effect regression specification (5) 
Table 11 shows the results from the fixed effect regression defined by specification (5): ∆Yi,t = Pi +βBAi,t+ 
ei,t. The standard within regression is presented first, followed by Newey-West and Beck-Katz robust 
standard error estimations.  
 
Since the liquidity proxy (∆BAi,t) is included in this model only to control for differences in 
liquidity between the green and the synthetic bond, it is of limited interest in this analysis. Of 
particular interest is the 77 fixed effects (Pi) estimated, corresponding to 77 greeniums. The 
model analyzes each bond pair separately and estimates one greenium (fixed effect) for each 
of the bond pairs. For example, if a bond pair consists of 1000 daily yield difference 
observations, the fixed effect model will use those 1000 observations to estimate one single 
greenium for that given pair. Having 77 matched pairs, then, gives a total sample size of 77 
estimated greenium values, reduced down from a total sample size of 29,629 yield difference 
observations. Since the fixed effects model allows for individual treatment of each bond pair, 
one can argue that the estimated greenium values will be independent of each other. Hence, 
the number of yield observations within each pair of bonds will not affect the overall 
distribution of the estimated greeniums. 
Table 12 presents the summary statistics of the estimated fixed effects from the FE regression. 
The estimated fixed effects are distributed between -25.67 bp and 15.34 bp, with a median 
value of -0.18 bp and a mean equal -0.4 bp. 57.14 percent of the fixed effects calculated are 
negative. Since greenium is defined as the yield of the green bond minus the yield of the 
conventional bond, a negative fixed effect value here indicates a greenium. In other words, 
our findings of a negative fixed effect mean of -0.4 bp are the same as a mean greenium of 0.4 
bp.  
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Table 12: Distribution of the full sample fixed effects 
 
 
Table 12 presents the distribution of the 77 estimated greeniums defined as the fixed effect (Pi) of 
specification (5): ∆Yi,t = Pi +βBAi,t+ ei,t, 
 
The results show that the green bonds in our sample trade on average at a lower yield of 0.4 
bp compared to the synthetical conventional bond matches. The estimated negative yield 
difference calculated is relatively small compared to the average bond ask yield, and it can be 
argued that it is irrelevant in practical economic terms. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test with a 
null hypothesis, Pi = 0, is conducted on the whole sample to test whether the calculated mean 
greenium is, in fact, statistically different from zero. With a p-value equal to 0.1451, the test 
fails to reject the null hypothesis at the 10 % level, and the estimated mean greenium of 0.4 
bp can, therefore, not be said to be statistically different from zero. So even though the 
distribution and mean estimation indicate the existence of a greenium in the Nordic market, it 
cannot be concluded that this estimated negative yield difference is, in fact, different from 
zero. 
As mentioned in Selection 4.1, a robustness test is conducted to control low turnover in the 
Nordic bond markets by doing the regression on both weekly and monthly yield observations. 
The results of this test are presented in Appendix Figure A4. The main findings from these 
regressions are that both weekly and monthly observations yield similar results, as in the case 
of daily data, with no significant greenium for the full sample.  
6.2 Greenium in different subsamples  
For the whole sample, the estimated mean greenium of 0.4 bp is not statistically different from 
zero. However, to identify if the greenium varies for different types of bonds, the full sample 
is divided into subsamples based on different bond characteristics. Table 13 presents the fixed 
effect mean and median for the different subsamples, and the calculated p-value from the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the subsamples consisting of eight or more bonds. 
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Three of the created subsamples have a greenium, which is significantly different from null. 
Thereby the null hypothesis of no yield difference is rejected for these three market segments. 
For green bonds issued in SEK, findings show a mean greenium of 0.64 bp, significant at the 
10 % level. The estimations also show a 0.60 bp mean greenium for investment grade green 
bonds, significant at the 5% level. Additionally, a mean greenium of 1.2 bp is found for bonds 
with an issue amount between 251-500 million SEK, significant at the five percent level. For 
the other subsamples, the estimated mean and median greeniums are not significant, but it is 
worth noting that most of them are negative. 
 
Table 13: Greenium in different subsamples 
Table 13 shows the estimated mean and median fixed effect for the different subsamples. The table also 
presents the level of significance at which the null H0: Pi = 0 is rejected. Additionally, the number of green 
bonds in each subsample is presented.  
 
The results from the subsampling indicate a variation in greenium between different types of 
green bonds. Our findings are consistent with the finding of Zerbib (2019), who also reports 
variation in the green bond premium between different subsamples.  
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As described in section 4.6, some of the subsamples contain many of the same triplets. Table 
14 presents an overview of how many of the same triplets that are used in the three subsamples 
in which there exist statistically significant greeniums. There seems to be a clear overlap of 
bonds used between these subsamples. Ninety-two percent of the investment grade bonds are 
also denominated in SEK, while 93 percent of SEK denominated bonds are investment grade. 
The high degree of overlap might explain why the estimated greenium for SEK denominated 
bonds and Investment Grade bonds are quite similar. Additionally, all of the bonds with an 
issue amount between 251-500 million SEK are investment grade bonds. However, just 42 
percent of the investment grade bonds and only 39 percent of SEK denominated bonds have 
an issue amount between 251-500 million SEK. This difference might explain why the 
estimated greenium for bonds with an issue amount between 251-500 million SEK is different 
compared to the other two subsamples.  
Table 14: Matrix of how many triplets that are used in the subsamples 
with significant greeniums 
Table 14 presents a matrix of how many of the same triplets that are used in the same subsamples, both in 
absolute numbers and in % overlap. The diagonal, marked in grey, represents the total number of triplets 
in each category. The percentage numbers in each row are the percentage overlap between two categories 
and the total number of triplets in the category on the left column. In other words, the total of observations 
that are in both categories divided by the total number of triplets in the category. The number shows how 
many triplets that are present in both categories.       
 
6.3 Determinants of the green bond premium  
In order to analyze whether different bond characteristics can explain the variations in the 
greenium, the linear regressions from specifications (6) and (7) are performed. The estimated 
greeniums is regressed on different bond characteristics. Specification (6) and (7) differs in 
the included explanatory variables. Specification (6) includes Seniority, while specification 
(7), instead include Industry group as an independent variable. Because robustness tests 
indicate the existence of heteroscedasticity, both specifications are made robust by using 
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White-Robust standard error estimators. The R-square of the two specifications equals 0.121 
and 0.139. Hence the included variables explain little of the total variation in the greenium.   
Table 15 presents the results of specification (6) and specification (7). "Current coupon” is the 
only statistically significant coefficient in both specifications. The Current Coupon coefficient 
equals 0.023 for specifications (6) and 0.022 for specification (7). Both of these results are 
significant at the 10 % level. According to these results, a 1-bp increase in the bond coupon is 
associated with 0.023(0.022) bp positive increase in the greenium. Similar to Zerbib (2019), 
this thesis includes log issue amount, maturity, and currency as explanatory variables. Our 
results are consistent with Zerbib (2019), who finds that issue amount, maturity, and currency 
have no significant effect on the level of greenium. 
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Table 15: Results from specification (6) and (7)  
 
Table 15 presents the results of specification (6) and (7), used to explain the potential determinants of the 
greenium. The estimated greenium from specification (5) serves as the dependent variable and is expressed 
in basis points. For qualitative explanatory variables, modalities consisting of only one observation is 
deleted. Maturity is the length of the bond expressed in years from issuance until the maturity date. Current 
Coupon is the last Coupon rate of the bond before 21.10.2019. Log Issue Amount (SEK) is the logarithm 
of the Issue Amount expressed in SEK. Currency is a qualitative variable with two values: SEK (reference 
value) and NOK. Coupon type is a qualitative variable with two values: Fixed (reference value) and FRN 
(floating rate). HY/IG is a qualitative variable with two values: Investment Grade (reference value) and 
High Yield. Risk is a qualitative variable with three values: Senior Unsecured (reference value), 
Government Guaranteed, and Senior Secured. (Municipality not included because of only one observation). 
Industry group is a qualitative variable with five values: Real Estate (reference value), Bank, Public Sector, 
Transportation, and Utilities. Industry, Consumer services, and Pulp, paper and forestry are not included 
because of only one observation      
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7. Discussion   
This section will discuss and compare the findings of our thesis with the findings from existing 
literature on bond greeniums. The second part of the section will discuss potential limitations 
with the methodology and the data used in our thesis. 
7.1 Discussion of results 
The results from the fixed effect regression indicate that our sample of Nordic green bonds, 
on average, trade at a 0.4 bp lower yield in the secondary market compared to identical 
conventional bonds from the same issuer. However, this estimated yield difference is neither 
statistically nor economically significant. Hence, based on this finding, the null hypothesis, 
stating that there is no difference in yield between green and conventional bonds in the Nordic 
market as a whole, cannot be rejected.  
The findings of no statistically significant greenium are in line with the findings of Larcker 
and Watts (2019), who examine green US municipal bonds and find no evidence of a greenium 
in the secondary market. The overall result, of no significant yield difference in the secondary 
market between green and conventional bonds in the Nordics, differs from the overall findings 
of Zerbib (2019) and Barclays (2015), who report a significant greenium of respectively 1.8 
bp and 17 bp in their research on the global market.   
A possible explanation for why our results differ from the findings of Zerbib (2019) and 
Barclays (2015) is the structural dissimilarities between the Nordic and the global green bond 
market. As shown in section 4.8 (Table 5), SEK denominated green bonds account for around 
80 percent of the Nordic green bond market. Simultaneously, according to Danske Bank 
(2019), only eight percent of the global green bond market is issued in SEK. Additionally, as 
shown in table 5, around 60 percent of Nordic green bonds are issued by real estate companies. 
However, only 30 percent of global green bond proceeds are used on real estate projects 
(CBI,2019d). Hence, it seems that the Nordic green bond market, to a larger extent, is 
dominated by real estate companies compared to the global green bond market. 
Structural dissimilarities between the Nordic and the global green bond market, like to ones 
presented above, might attract different types of investors with different preferences towards 
green bonds. A different investor base between market segments can again lead to a variation 
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in the estimated greenium between these markets. It is also worth noting that Zerbib (2019), 
who finds a significant negative yield difference between green and conventional bonds when 
analyzing the full sample, also reports a significant variation in the greenium between different 
currencies. For some of the currencies he analyzes, he does not find statistically significant 
greenium. His results, therefore, indicate that the existence of a greenium can vary between 
different market segments. This might explain why Larcker and Watts (2019), who study the 
US municipal market, and our study on the Nordic market, finds no significant greenium.  
Another possible explanation for why our results differ from the findings of Zerbib (2019) is 
that our analysis includes both fixed- and floating rate coupon bonds, while Zerbib (2019) only 
analyzes fixed rate coupon bonds. Also worth mentioning is the sample size of Zerbib’s study, 
which contains 110 triplets. Due to the limited amount of bonds, it can be discussed whether 
the findings can be generalized to the global population of green bonds. 
As mentioned, our findings cannot reject the null hypothesis and say with certainty that there 
exists a greenium in the Nordic market as a whole. However, the findings in our study show 
that in some subsamples, there exist small statistically significant greeniums. For green bonds 
issued in SEK, green bonds issued by investment grade companies, and green bonds with an 
issue amount between 251-500 million SEK, there exist small, but statistically significant 
greeniums of respectively 0.64 bp, 0.60 bp, and 1.12 bp. These negative yield differences are 
all statistically significant. However, because of the low magnitude, one can argue that the 
greeniums found has limited economic value. 
Nevertheless, the number of SEK denominated bonds and Investment grade bonds in our 
sample are relatively much higher compared to the number of NOK and High Yield bonds. 
The considerable variation in the number of bonds between subsamples most likely explains 
why there exist significant results for some subsamples consisting of many bonds, and not for 
subsamples only consisting of few bonds, such as NOK and High yield. Also, as described in 
section 6.2, there is a clear overlap in the bonds used between the two subsamples; SEK and 
Investment Grade.  This overlap might explain why the statistically significant greeniums for 
these two subsamples are almost identical. 
The statistically significant greenium fund for bonds issued in SEK is inconsistent with the 
findings of Zerbib (2019), which find no significant greenium for SEK denominated bonds. 
However, it is worth mentioning that Zerbib (2018) uses a sample consisting of 17 green bonds 
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issued in SEK, while ours include a total of 71 SEK green bonds. Hence, the small sample size 
used by Zerbib (2019) might explain why he does not find a statistically significant greenium 
for SEK denominated green bonds.  
These findings of a statistically significant negative yield difference for some of the 
subsamples can be an indication of a small mismatch between the demand and the supply of 
these green bonds. If the demand for green bonds is relatively high compared to the supply, 
then this will drive up the price of these bonds, lowering their yields. Another potential 
explanation is that some investors have incorporated the sustainability of their investments in 
their required rate of return, and thereby require a lower return from green projects than from 
regular projects.  
A possible reason for a hike in demand for green bonds is the increased focus on ESG among 
investors. This hypothesis is supported by the substantial growth in the number of institutional 
investors who have signed the UN-backed Principles of Responsible Investments (PRI, 2019) 
and the sharp increase in the number of so-called responsible investment funds during the last 
couple of years (KPMG, 2019). The increased focus on ESG can, among other things, been 
seen as a result of different initiatives such as the Paris Climate Agreement and the Sustainable 
Development Goals, explained in section 2.3. Initiatives like these have stressed the important 
role capital markets play in the effort to move the world in a more sustainable direction. Green 
bonds are viewed as instruments that can help mobilize the capital required to achieve these 
goals, leading to an increase in demand.  
The indicated increase in demand might also be e result of the development of better and more 
mainstream standards and procedures when it comes to verifying the greenness of the bonds. 
Better standards have made the green bond market more trustworthy by reducing the risk of 
greenwashing (KPMG, 2016). This has potentially attracted a broader investor base and 
increased the transaction rate, which has further risen the demand for green bonds. 
There are also several reasons why the supply of green bonds might be insufficient relative to 
the demand. One viable explanation can be that there are not enough profitable green projects 
for companies to invest in, or that financial incentives to invest in green projects are too few. 
According to the European Commission (2016), several companies also struggle to obtain a 
good credit rating on their green bonds compared to conventional bonds. The lower credit 
rating on green bonds will increase the cost of capital, making a green issuance less attractive 
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for those companies. Another reason can be the higher cost associated with a green bond 
issuance (I4CE, 2017). This extra cost consists of among other things, getting an external 
review on the greenness of the bond, monitoring cost (monitoring the use of proceeds), and 
possible reputational and legal cost if the proceeds are not used as intended. These extra costs 
can be a burden for the companies, increasing the barriers to issue green bonds instead of 
conventional bonds. 
The small negative greenium found in some of the subsamples can be beneficial for issuers. 
Firstly, it is an indication that investors have an appetite for certain types of green bonds in the 
Nordic market. Secondly, the findings can be an indication that investors are willing to receive 
a lower yield on these green bonds compared to conventional bonds when trading in the 
secondary market. Hence, it is also possible that issuers can offer a lower yield on their green 
bonds compared to identical conventional bonds at issuance, reducing their cost of financing. 
However, our quantitative results on the secondary market alone are not sufficient enough to 
conclude on investors’ preferences. Additionally, it is worth noting that even though our 
analysis indicates the existence of a statistically significant greenium in some of the 
subsamples, the greeniums are all relatively small compared to the ask yields. Hence the 
possible effect on the cost of capital might be quite limited in economic terms.    
 
7.2 Limitations  
Our research has used the same empirical methods as Zerbib (2019). The key idea behind this 
method is to isolate the greenium by calculating the yield difference between the green bond 
and two identical conventional bonds from the same issuer. Still, because it is not possible to 
find completely identical matches, some limitations need to be addressed.  
As mentioned in section 4.2, the matching method builds on the prerequisite that the matched 
samples are entirely identical, except for the variable of interest. In our case, this means that 
the green bond and the two conventional bonds should be equal in all variables/characteristics 
except for one, whether or not the bond is labeled as green. However, it is close to impossible 
to find bonds absolutely identical in all characteristics and still get a sufficient sample size. 
Therefore, our thesis follows Zerbib (2019), and implements limitations in the allowance of 
variation between the green bond and the conventional bonds for characteristics were identical 
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matching is impossible. Since this method does not match the green bonds with truly identical 
conventional bonds, there is a chance that some of the estimated yield differences are a result 
of structural differences in our triplets and not evidence of a greenium.  
To control for differences in maturity between the green bond and the two conventional bond 
matches, a synthetic bond with the same maturity as the green bond is creased using inter-
/exptrapolation. For linear interpolation/extrapolation to be relevant, one needs to assume that 
there is a linear relationship between maturity and yield. Since the yield curve can take various 
shapes, there is a chance that the “linear” assumption does not hold over large intervals. 
However, the potential error from linear interpolation/extrapolation is diminished by 
restricting the maturity differences of our matches, leading to small intervals between the three 
bonds in each triplet.   
Another limitation of this research is the sample size and the quality of the data used. As this 
study focus on the Nordic green bond market, there is a limited number of green bonds 
accessible to analyze. As a result, our analysis may suffer from a small sample size bias, 
leading to misleading results. Another concern is that most of the bonds listed on the Nordic 
exchanges do not trade frequently. Hence there is a possibility that the yields do not reflect the 
fair values of the bonds. As a consequence, the estimated yield differences between green and 
conventional bonds may not reflect a greenium, but rather be a result of noise.  
Additionally, and as described in section 4.9, descriptive statistics show that there are 
significant structural differences in several characteristics between our sample of 77 green 
bonds and the whole Nordic green bond universe. Because our bonds are not truly 
representative of the whole Nordic bond universe, the possibility to generalize the results to 
also apply for the whole Nordic green bond market is limited.  
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8. Conclusion 
Climate change is recognized as one of the most prominent threats to humanity in the 21st 
century. Different Initiatives such as the Paris Climate Agreement, and the development of 
Principles for Responsible Investments (PRI), have stressed the vital role financial markets 
play in the effort to move the world in a more environmentally friendly direction. It is 
estimated that a significant amount of investments into sustainable projects are needed to meet 
the goals set in the Paris Climate Agreement. Green bonds are a relatively new type of financial 
instrument developed to address this problem by channelizing capital into more 
environmentally friendly projects.  
The main objective of our thesis was to determine if there exists a greenium in the Nordic 
secondary bond market. The potential greenium was found by analyzing the yield difference 
between green bonds and constructed synthetic bonds. Each synthetic bond was made by 
combining two conventional bonds, which are similar to the green bond in all aspects except 
for not being green. Then a fixed effects regression was run where the yield difference between 
the green and the synthetic bond was regressed on a liquidity proxy to control for differences 
in liquidity. The greeniums is defined by the estimated fixed effects in the regression. The 
sample was further divided into subsamples to test for potential differences between different 
market segments. Lastly, a regression of the estimated greenium on different bond 
characteristics was conducted to capture the potential determinants of the greenium.   
In the analysis of our whole bond sample, no significant difference between green- and 
conventional bonds in the secondary market is found. Hence, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for the Nordic market as a whole. Our results, therefore, support standard theory, 
stating that investors only take the trade-off between risk and reward into consideration when 
making investment decisions. 
On the other hand, the results from the subsample analysis indicate that for some of the market 
segments, there exist small greenium (Green bonds have a lower yield than conventional 
bonds). For bonds issued in SEK, a greenium of 0.64 bp statistically significant at the 10 
percent level is found. For bonds issued by investment grade companies, the greenium equals 
0.60 bp. Bonds with an issue amount between 251-500 million SEK has a greenium of 1.12 
bp. Both of these findings are significant at the 5 percent level. For the other subsamples, the 
estimated yield differences between green and conventional bonds are not significant, but it is 
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worth noting that most of them are negative. These findings of significant greeniums in some 
subsamples may be an indication of a small mismatch between the demand and supply of these 
green bonds. Or that investors account for the sustainability of their investments in their 
investment decisions. The greenium found is small and potentially not of much relevance in 
economic terms. It can, therefore, be discussed if our null hypothesis can be rejected for these 
subsamples. Further, as the matched sample is systematically different from the whole Nordic 
green bond market, our findings cannot be generalized to be applicable for the whole Nordic 
green bond market. However, they can be used as an indication or a hypothesis of what results 
might be expected in the market.   
Further, our analysis of potential determinants of the greenium yields low explanatory power. 
Hence, the bond characteristics included in the model explain little of the total variation in the 
yield difference between green and conventional bonds. In both specifications, only the 
coupon rate has statistically significant explanatory power. 
Our thesis creates opportunities for further research. Green bonds are a relatively new type of 
financial security, and our results are based on a limited number of observations.  As the green 
bond market grows, more data will become available. Future research can take advantage of 
the extended amount of data and provide stronger evidence on the potential yield differences 
between green and conventional bonds, both globally and in sub-markets such as the Nordic 
market. Additionally, future research can investigate whether the issuance of green bonds 
affects conventional bonds from the same issuer. For example, one could analyze if a green 
bond issuance changes a firm's ability to issue conventional bonds, or if there exist other 
synergies associated with green bond issuance. As our research is quantitative, another idea 
for further research could be to use a qualitative approach. Interviewing both issuers and 
investors of green bonds could give valuable insight into investor preferences, not captured by 
a quantitative approach, like motivation for issuance and investor's motivation for buying. Our 
study on Nordic green bonds could also be extended to other specific markets, or other types 
of bonds, for example, social impact bonds. 
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10. Appendix – Figures  
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: ∆Bid-ask density. This figure shows the density of the liquidity proxy (∆BAi,t )  
 
 
Figure A1: Extrapolation and Interpolation of the synthetic conventional bond yield. This figure shows how the 
synthetic conventional bond yield is calculated using linear extrapolation (a), and linear interpolation (b).  
 
(a)  (b)  
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Figure A3: Listed green bonds in the Nordics. This figure presents a list of the total listed green 
bond market in the Nordic market. Source: Stamdata, Authors’ calculations 
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Figure A4: Green bond premium in different subsamples. Figure A4 shows the mean and median green 
bond premium for the different subsamples and for different observation intervals. The table also presents 
the level of significance at which the null H0: Pi = 0 is rejected. Additionally, the number of green bonds in 
each subsample is presented. 
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Figure A5: Matched sample of green bonds. The list presents the company name and ISIN number of the green 
bonds used in this analysis. 
